Research

We show that workers with fixed-term contracts are substantially more likely to apply for and be awarded disability insurance (DI) benefits than permanent workers. We study whether this differential can be explained by (i) selection of worker types into contracts, (ii) the relation between contract type and the risk of illness, (iii) differences in employer support during illness, and (iv) differences in labour market prospects of ill workers. We find that selection actually masks part of the differential, whereas the impact of contract type on health is limited. In contrast, the difference in employer support during illness is a significant cause of the heightened DI risk of temporary workers, especially in slack labour markets. We therefore conclude that, conditional on being ill, workers with fixed-term contracts face different support structures and incentives that make them more likely to ultimately apply for and be awarded DI.

Spikes in exits at unemployment insurance (UI) benefit exhaustion into other benefit schemes such as sickness insurance (SI) are well-documented. These spikes could be driven by relatively healthy workers maximizing their total duration of benefit receipt, or workers in ill health who remain on UI while incapable of working. While the first explanation calls for a stricter SI and UI system, the second highlights the need for increased information provision. We study the importance of these explanations by first documenting a spike in exits into SI at UI benefit exhaustion in the Netherlands. Comparing detailed health and labor market characteristics of exit cohorts, we show that the spike is unlikely to be driven by maximizing behavior of relatively healthy workers. Instead, our results point to catch-up of initial non-take-up of SI by workers with substantial mental and physical health conditions. This opposes earlier work on substitution between UI and SI/DI.

While a large share of Disability Insurance recipients in OECD countries are expected to recover, outflow rates from temporary disability schemes are typically negligible. We estimate the disincentive effects of disability benefits on the response to a (mental) health improvement using administrative data on all Dutch disability benefit applicants. We compare those below the DI eligibility threshold with those above and find that disincentives significantly reduce work resumption after health improves. Approximately half of the response to recovery is offset by benefits. Estimates from a structural labor supply model suggest that disincentives are substantially larger when the worker's earnings capacity is fully restored.tem